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Contemporary philosophical debates surrounding toleration have revolved around 
three issues: What is toleration?  Should we tolerate and, if so, why?  What should be 
tolerated?  These questions are of central importance to social and political thought.  
While I cannot also do justice here to the history of toleration, its pedigree should be 
noted.   
The most important historical thinkers to discuss toleration are Saint Augustine, 
Baruch Spinoza, Pierre Bayle, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill (see AUGUSTINE, 
SAINT; SPINOZA, BARUCH; LOCKE, JOHN; MILL, JOHN STUART).  Augustine 
provides the first significant defense of religious toleration—on the grounds that one 
cannot force genuine religious belief since individuals do not choose at will what they 
believe.  Later thinkers—Bayle and Locke, in particular—sought to improve upon and 
supplement Augustine’s argument for toleration.   
It is through Locke’s work that toleration becomes central to liberal theory (see 
LIBERALISM).  It is Mill, though, who gives the most powerful explication and defense 
of the extent of toleration.  His famous harm principle (see HARM PRINCIPLE), which 
echoes Locke’s view, is the most famous normative principle of toleration. 
 
2. What Toleration Is 
Toleration clearly involves noninterference.  We do not tolerate P if we stop P 
from acting or if we make P’s action more difficult.  (Some early modern thinkers deny 
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the latter, allowing that religious toleration is consistent with taxing groups differentially, 
for example.  They thus ask a fourth distinct question—“what does toleration require?”)  
Noninterference is the point of toleration; that is, an act is only an act of toleration if 
noninterference is its intent.  About this, most readily agree.  However, with further 
thought, people generally realize that “intentional noninterference” is not a satisfactory 
definition. 
We would not say lovers of Brahms tolerate his music.  Enjoying something 
makes it conceptually impossible to tolerate it.  One can tolerate X only if one has some 
objection to X.  Some insist that moral disapproval and not mere dislike must be present; 
others insist the latter is sufficient.  Philosophers agree, though, that some element of 
opposition must be present.   
Some argue that in at least one sense, one can “tolerate” what one approves of.  
For these thinkers, a society that truly tolerates differences cherishes those differences 
and (raising that fourth question) may seek to sustain them.  While a philosopher might 
approve of the substantive political commitment that view entails, she would call it 
“multiculturalism” rather than “toleration” (see MULTICULTURALISM).  I assume the 
philosophical view here. 
The philosophical view faces a quandary: if we dislike or morally disapprove of 
X, why tolerate it?  This indicates another necessary element: a principled reason for the 
noninterference.  If one refrains from interfering without some principled reason—
perhaps out of laziness or fear—one is not tolerating.  If one refrains from interfering for 
an unprincipled reason—perhaps with the hope that something worse will befall the 
other—one is not tolerating.  There is, though, debate about what reasons count as 
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principled.  Some insist toleration is grounded in individual autonomy, rights, or respect 
(see AUTONOMY; RIGHTS; RESPECT).  Others take a broader view, allowing that 
other values may undergird the principled noninterference. 
Thus, there are three primary elements of toleration: for P to tolerate X, P must 
intentionally refrain from interfering with X, P must dislike or disapprove of X, and P’s 
noninterference must be for a principled reason.  These are widely agreed to be necessary 
for toleration.  Others suggest additional elements (see Cohen 2004). 
Importantly, the reason one refrains from interfering when one genuinely tolerates 
can differ from the reason toleration is morally valuable (the topic of section 4).  In the 
first case, the reason (along with opposition) makes the intentional noninterference 
toleration; in the second case, it may make the toleration morally valuable.  That these 
can differ makes possible genuine but morally mistaken toleration.  For example, 
autonomy is often the reason noninterference is toleration.  (Some claim only autonomy 
plays this role.)  If one mistakenly believes noninterference in a particular case is 
required in order to respect another’s autonomy, one has a principled, though mistaken, 
reason for noninterference; such noninterference would therefore be toleration.  However, 
given the factual mistake, the toleration may not be morally valuable.  If the two reasons 
were necessarily the same, every instance of genuine toleration would be morally 
valuable, but surely we can tolerate wrongly.  Hence, while there is an essentially 
normative element of toleration, recognition of that element does not settle the normative 
question “Should we tolerate?”  
 
3. Toleration and Tolerance 
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Although we often use the terms “toleration” and “tolerance” synonymously, we 
also use the latter in a very different way: to refer to an attitude or virtue rather than a 
type of behavior.  It is helpful to reserve “tolerance” for the former and “toleration” for 
the latter. 
People can exhibit tolerance, be tolerant, and act tolerantly.  Being tolerant is a 
matter of having a particular sort of attitude.  It may also be a virtue (see Newey, 85-120).  
As a virtue, it would involve a disposition to refrain from interfering.  Importantly, that 
disposition need not be directed only toward things opposed.  A person is tolerant of 
things she approves of or is indifferent to.  Lovers of Brahms, to use that example again, 
likely have a high tolerance for his music.  Clearly, tolerance may be present without 
toleration.  So too, acts of toleration are not necessarily tolerant.  One might continue to 
seethe at the thought of R doing X—exhibiting intolerance—while tolerating it. 
A tolerant person or act may not be a tolerating person or act.  Since one must 
oppose what one tolerates, someone who is so tolerant that they oppose nothing, cannot 
tolerate.  Tolerance and toleration—while related—are not co-extensive.   
 
4. Defending toleration 
There are many arguments for toleration, including arguments that attempt to 
show that it is conceptually connected to other goods such as autonomy, rationality, self-
respect, equal respect, rights, increased societal knowledge, peace, good living, societal 
advancement, and religious salvation (see RATIONALITY; SELF-RESPECT AND 
SELF-ESTEEM). 
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Perhaps most famous is Augustine’s argument from the nature of genuine 
religious belief: since faith cannot be forced, individuals must be tolerated so they might 
attain salvation.  Credere non potest nisi volens—belief has no power (to help us attain 
salvation) if it is not free.  Augustine assumes we cannot just will to believe something 
(doxastic voluntarism is false).  Empirical evidence about belief acquisition, though, may 
render that assumption irrelevant.  Indeed, Augustine came to reject his own argument 
when he saw persecuted Donatist heretics accept orthodoxy.  He did not think this 
required doxastic voluntarism; he simply realized that people can be forced into situations 
in which they gradually come freely to believe.  Over time, force—lack of toleration—
can indirectly change beliefs even if individuals cannot just will to believe.  Forcing 
someone to listen to an argument might make her more likely to accept its conclusion, if 
only because having heard the argument, she becomes accustomed to her once-rejected 
view.  (Of course, without toleration, some ‘heretics’ are likely killed or isolated so that 
others never get to hear their view, directly contributing to its disappearance.)  The 
argument’s success is thus limited.  Later thinkers improve on it by arguing that genuine 
belief requires an individual’s reasoned assent.  Bayle’s argument for toleration (arguably 
the best of these) is based on respect for that use of reason, which is on firmer 
epistemological ground than faith (see Spinoza, Chapter 15; Bayle, 74; Locke, 68 and 
esp. 299; and Forst 2008, 96-106). 
Mill offers a related argument that Joel Feinberg calls the “moral muscles” 
argument: since the faculty of reason is of paramount value—without it, one is not a 
moral being, not a person—we must allow and even encourage its development, and the 
best way to do this is to tolerate differences so people must sort through them (Feinberg 
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1986, 384 note 5; see FEINBERG, JOEL).  Individuals develop and/or maintain 
(depending on how the argument is fleshed out) their rational capacities—their moral 
muscles—as they consider views in contrast with (often opposing) their own. 
Other related arguments from Mill concern truth acquisition and justification of 
belief.  Mill claims that if we do not allow dissent, we will prohibit the hearing of 
possibly true propositions.  If they are true and successfully prohibited, Mill believes that 
truth is essentially stolen from those who would otherwise hear it.  If they are false, he 
believes, there would be theft—not of the truth, but of opportunities to clarify the truth 
(of allowed beliefs) and to develop sincere commitment rather than mere acquiescence 
(to those beliefs).  Since acquiescence leaves one without justification, this entails a loss 
of knowledge—true justified belief.  On Mill’s view, justification requires scrutinizing 
beliefs before accepting them and toleration promotes this since it requires allowing 
dissent, and that encourages listeners to consider alternatives (see SPEECH, FREEDOM 
OF). 
Consider, finally, Mill’s argument for societal progress, which begins by noting 
that tolerating individuals’ non-standard behaviors (consider the Wright brothers’ first 
flight, which many thought crazy) allows them to develop better ways of performing 
daily tasks (typically while engaging in a project they think valuable) and, thus, to 
develop better ways of life.  Since such innovations can benefit everyone and since we 
cannot know who will develop them, the argument continues, we should have extensive 
toleration of differences so that society can improve.  (Those committed to traditional 
ways of life may find this threatening.) 
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I cannot discuss other arguments for toleration here (see Forst 2003), except to 
note that we must not think of toleration as only about others.  It is too easy, when 
thinking about whether someone else should be tolerated, to conclude that toleration is 
not warranted.  Toleration is important to each of us because someone else might think 
our way of life should not be tolerated.  If we want our ways of life to be tolerated, we 
should be prepared to defend toleration in general.  Of course, there are limits. 
 
5. The Limits of Toleration and the Paradox of Liberalism 
Toleration is a good but there must be limits.  We simply do not, should not, and 
indeed, cannot, tolerate murder or rape, for example.  But what are the proper limits of 
toleration?  What should we, as individuals and as societies tolerate?  This debate is not 
solely academic.  Polities often face this question.  Should minority religious practices be 
tolerated?  Should homosexuality?  Marijuana?  Ad infinitum.  (There is debate about 
whether governments have intentions and whether such intentions have moral weight; 
this matters since toleration requires intentional non-interference.  Here, I suggest only 
that toleration at the state level is a matter of policy—in some sense, intentional—
allowing activity that might be opposed by some part of the citizenry, though not 
necessarily by those enforcing the policy.) 
If we are to answer the normative question for states, we have to recognize that 
what it is conceptually possible for a particular state to tolerate will be determined by 
what is opposed therein.  What I can tolerate depends on what I oppose; similarly, what a 
state can tolerate depends on what is opposed within it.  When a state—or those within 
it—oppose an activity, it can make a law against the activity or decide that such a law is 
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unjustified and that toleration of the activity is required.  Importantly, which of those 
things that can be tolerated in the polity will be tolerated will depend on the publicly 
recognized reasons to tolerate.  Imagine, e.g., a Christian country wherein it is commonly 
believed that religious practices of Jews and Muslims must be tolerated, though those of 
Mormon Polygamists must not.  Though all are opposed, the first two are thought worthy 
of toleration and the last is not.  Of course, that a particular practice would not be 
tolerated is not to say that it should not be tolerated.   
Historically, it was liberals that were most committed to extensive toleration.  It 
was they that argued for toleration of competing religions and, later, competing cultures.  
That liberals would tolerate more then others does not, in the minds of non-liberals, tell 
us what ought to be tolerated.  So how do we make progress on this question?  Or must 
we admit, with critics of liberalism, that toleration is a false ideal and that different 
polities simply have competing visions of what must be tolerated? 
This problem is sometimes called the “paradox of liberalism.”  (This is different 
from the “paradox of toleration,” which is concerned with the necessity of tolerating acts 
of non-toleration.)  The paradox might be framed as follows.  Persons living in a liberal 
state who are militantly anti-liberal should either be tolerated or not.  If tolerated, non-
liberalism—which limits toleration—seems to be allowed.  If not tolerated, the state is 
non-liberal.  Liberalism thus seems defeated since it is a commitment to toleration, which 
is curtailed either way (this would hold even if, as I suspect, the liberal will tolerate non-
harmful anti-liberal activity like speech acts but not harmful activity).  Liberals are 
committed to the broadest range of liberty and toleration possible and so the narrowest 
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range of morally permissible interferences but, the paradox supposedly shows, this is not 
all that extensive. 
Put bluntly, the question is: can a liberal state outlaw those seeking to end its rule?  
More generally, can a regime force compliance with its principles and remain committed 
to those principles?  This is supposedly paradoxical for liberalism because forcing 
compliance means not tolerating and a liberal regime is a regime of toleration, so forcing 
compliance undermines the regime.  (Hence, we should call this “the paradox of regimes 
of toleration.”) It is, then, the commitment to a principle of toleration (which indicates 
narrow limits of permissible interference) that raises the paradox.  The principle may be a 
Rawlsian principle of political legitimacy such that “the basic structure [of society] and 
its public policies are to be justifiable to all citizens” (Rawls 1993, 224) or something like 
Mill’s harm principle (see next section), which indicates that harm to others is the only 
reason to end toleration.  The paradox may seem especially potent against the latter: 
endorsement of the harm principle seems tantamount to an endorsement of a conception 
of the good—or at least a claim that no other conception of the good is sufficient to 
warrant interference.   
Imagine a religious group R, a central belief of which is that having all act in 
accord with the tenets of R is required for anyone to lead a good life.  Adherents of R will 
reject the harm principle.  Interfering with their (perhaps forceful) proselytizing seems to 
require rejecting R’s claim about the good life.  It also suggests a commitment to the 
good life defined as including freedom of choice.  The Rawlsian principle, though 
apparently only procedural, actually fairs no better.  It too requires rejecting R’s claim 
about the good life and suggests a commitment to the good life as including freedom—
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freedom to live under a regime that one could reasonably endorse.  There are, after all, 
“limits to what public reason can accomplish” (Rawls 1999b, 614). 
Importantly, all regimes can be characterized as regimes of toleration.  They 
simply specify the limits of toleration differently—according to different principles of 
toleration.  But the response to the paradox is clear.  The Christian regime discussed 
above, wherein Jews and Moslems were tolerated and Mormon Polygamists were not, 
forces compliance with its principles and remains committed to them. Polygamists lose 
out in such a regime because they violate the regime’s principles.  This does not make the 
regime less Christian.  In a liberal regime, there is extensive toleration, but some lose out 
nonetheless—because they violate the regime’s principles.  For a liberal committed to the 
harm principle, those claiming the right to harm others will lose out.  For a liberal 
committed to Rawls’s principle of political legitimacy, those claiming a right to impose 
laws on others that would reject them lose out.  In neither case, does this make the regime 
less liberal.  Liberals—those defending extensive toleration—will not tolerate those 
seeking to end liberalism.  If this is a paradox, it is worth noting that paradoxes are not 
contradictions and can be lived with.  Liberals can live with the paradox of liberalism 
because of the objective value of toleration.  (They need not insist everyone recognize 
that objective value.)   
 
6. What Should be Tolerated 
The treatment, above, of the paradox of liberalism may not convince everyone.  
Some will think the discussion shows that the value of toleration cannot be defended.  
This is not, in itself, worrisome.  Toleration, after all, is generally considered a dependent 
value.  It depends on some other value, namely whatever value(s) provides the principled 
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basis for non-interference, whether it be autonomy, peace, or something else.  It would 
thus be surprising if toleration could be defended on its own.  Moreover, as we have seen, 
everyone agrees that toleration has limits.  Indeed, in the contemporary western context, 
arguing that toleration in general is good seems decidedly odd since no one disputes it.  
Those that think interference in a particular case is permissible simply think the 
normative limits of toleration have been transgressed.  Hence, in this context, what 
matters is not defending toleration per se, but defending a specific view about what 
should be tolerated.  Once we defend such a view, we should uphold its principles—
though they may require that we remain open to further debate and the possibility that a 
strong countervailing argument will emerge. 
The question “what should be tolerated?” is a central question of social and 
political philosophy.  Importantly, we can tolerate good behavior (perhaps we dislike 
when family members give charity, for example) as well as bad (though telling lies may 
be bad, some must be tolerated).  It may be that we must, if we oppose them, tolerate 
prostitution, pornography, homosexuality, and same-sex marriage (see PROSTITUTION; 
PORNOGRAPHY; HOMOSEXUALITY; SAME-SEX MARRIAGE).  Regarding some 
of these, indifference may be better than toleration, but unattainable.  We need principles 
that indicate when toleration is required, should there be opposition.   
Normative jurisprudence is largely a search for principles indicating what the 
state should tolerate.  Feinberg enumerates nine such principles (see Feinberg 1990, xix-
xx).  The first is Mill’s famous harm principle: “The sole end for which mankind are 
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of 
their number is self-protection … the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
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exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm 
to others” (Mill, 9).  The idea is that harm (see HARM)—understood as wrongful 
setbacks to interests (see Feinberg 1984, 36)—is always a good reason to permit 
interference, whether to prevent its otherwise imminent occurrence, to penalize those 
who cause it, or to rectify its damage.  (Some deny, but most think, prohibiting activity 
statistically likely to cause harm is permitted on a Millian scheme.) 
It is important that Mill’s principle is about harm to others.  It does not permit 
interference—including failures to tolerate—to prevent harm to self.  Indeed, harm to self 
might seem conceptually impossible.  When a boxer is punched in the ring, we do not 
think there is a reason for interference.  This is because the boxer is presumed to have 
consented to the match and so to have no claim against his opponent (so long as his 
opponent abides by the rules).  Volenti non fit injuria—what one welcomes (or consents 
to) cannot be injurious (though it can hurt, it cannot be wrongful).  “Harm to self” thus 
seems oxymoronic: what one does, one consents to, so when one hurts oneself, one does 
not wrong oneself and so cannot harm oneself, no matter how much the hurt.  However, 
ignorance, deception, and mental defect can render a person unable to consent even to his 
own actions.  Where these are present, Volenti is thus irrelevant (see CONSENT; 
INFORMED CONSENT). 
Mill talks about combining spheres of action.  Just as one’s consent to one’s own 
actions means they cannot be harmful, one’s consent to another’s actions means they 
cannot be harmful.  Hence, the boxer.  When two or more people act upon one another 
with full consent, they are not to be interfered with if we adopt the harm principle as the 
sole normative principle of toleration. 
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The harm principle indicates that only harm justifies interference.  While all 
believe that harm at least often justifies interference, many believe interference can be 
justified in some cases where there is no harm.  Feinberg, for example, believes offense 
can also sometimes justify interference (see Feinberg 1988).  Others suggest offense only 
justifies interference when it is so severe that it causes harm.  Nazis marching in Skokie, 
IL, for example, seem not only offensive to the Holocaust survivors who live there, but 
also seem likely to wrongly setback the psychological interests of those survivors 
(harming them).  While physical pains (and thus physical harms) may be easier to assess, 
there is no principled reason to deny there are psychological harms or that the harm 
principle allows for interference to prevent (or rectify) them. 
Mill makes another distinction that deserves consideration.  He claims “definite 
damage, or a definite risk of damage” places an act in the province of morality or law but 
“merely contingent” injuries do not (Mill, 80).  The latter are injuries an individual may, 
but need not suffer.  For example, some claim to be harmed by merely knowing there are 
people that engage in homosexual activity.  Such activity, though, need not affect others 
“unless they like” (Mill, 73-74).  According to Mill, such acts do not merit interference.  
(We might think Volenti renders them non-harms.) 
Libertarian-minded liberals favor the harm principle as the only normative 
principle of toleration (see LIBERTARIANISM).  Feinberg prefers to include the offence 
principle.  Many liberals endorse further principles, especially a benefit-to-others 
principle, according to which, the provision of some significant benefit (perhaps 
determined by need) can justify interference.  Presumably with limits, such a principle 
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would provide justification for redistributive interferences to help individuals, perhaps in 
the name of need or equality. 
Less likely to be endorsed today are two principles that are important, historically 
and in contemporary politics.  These are legal paternalism and legal moralism (see 
PATERNALISM).  According to the first, interference is sometimes justified to prevent 
individuals from causing themselves undue harm.  According to the latter, interference is 
sometimes justified to prevent immoralities, even where these cause no individual harm.  
We’ve already seen that paternalism’s concern with an individual harming herself 
is conceptually problematic—but only when she is fully rational.  Hence, many advocate 
soft paternalism (also called soft anti-paternalism).  On this view, interference may be 
justified to ensure that when an individual acts in such a way that will cause hurt to only 
herself, she does so rationally and fully cognizant of the likely consequences.  Few reject 
this; many reject hard paternalism—the view that interference may be permitted to 
prevent an individual from harming herself even when she rationally endorses her action.  
Perhaps she wishes to ingest cocaine, fully aware of the risks. 
Various writers advocate moralism.  They might argue that homosexuality, for 
example, should remain illegal because immoral.  Some argue that such immoralities tear 
at the fabric of society, thus resulting in harm—to society as a whole or the individuals 
therein.  Others seem to believe that some “free-floating evils” are sufficient to justify 
interference, though they involve no harm at all (see Feinberg 1990, 3-38 and 124-175 
and Hart 1963, 48-52; see HART, H.L.A.). 
Before ending, it is worth discussing the Rawlsian alternative approach mentioned 
in the previous section, according to which laws must be justified by reasons acceptable 
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to all reasonable citizens (see RAWLS, JOHN and PUBLIC REASON).  On this view, 
we must tolerate anything that cannot be legislated against without violating that rule.  
Interference is warranted only where legislation permitting it cannot be reasonably 
rejected (see Rawls’s 1999b, 573-615, esp. 578-9).  This approach purports to avoid 
appealing to any particular conception(s) of the human good; it claims, instead, to offer a 
freestanding conception of liberalism that is the subject of a consensus among all 
reasonable doctrines within the society (see, e.g., Rawls 1999a, 144 and 176).  It thus 
claims to be maximally tolerating since it does not favor any particular groups.  By 
contrast, it is suggested, views that seek independent normative principles of toleration 
like those just discussed favor groups that promote autonomy or some other good.  
Advocates of the Rawlsian view recognize that what the overlapping consensus 
includes can only be determined through argument.  We cannot consider that here, but I 
suggest that in some form, the first principle discussed above would be part of the 
overlapping consensus in any just society. More importantly, though, any individual or 
group that fails to endorse the principles of the overlapping consensus would be deemed 
unreasonable and thus not respected (see Scalet).  It would seem, then, to reject certain 
conceptions of the good, even if it does not endorse a specific conception of the good 
itself.  (It seems to endorse a thin conception of the good that requires commitment to 
reasonableness.) 
While some do insist on promoting autonomy (Mill sometimes seems to), 
endorsing the harm principle—and some of the other principles discussed above—does 
not.  An advocate of that principle can admit that some groups limit their members’ 
liberty (or autonomy) and allow that such must be tolerated—provided no one in that 
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group is forced into it and no one in the group harms anyone outside the group.  While 
that provision may burden some groups, it can rightly be claimed that this is simply a 
result of fair and equal treatment of all and that the differential burden of a particular 
group given that treatment is not enough to show unfairness (see Barry, 24-40 and 118-
131). 
To be clear, the requirement that force not be used on individuals against their 
will is not a requirement to promote autonomy.  A concern with harm is not essentially a 
concern with autonomy.  Individuals can be harmed by having their autonomy wrongly 
set back, but they can also be harmed by having their interest in conforming to a group 
and giving up autonomy wrongly setback.  Some may reasonably choose to have their 
autonomy curtailed; the harm principle would thus require toleration of such, even 
though it would require not tolerating the forced removal of autonomy.  We can assume 
no one has the right to coerce others against their will without assuming all individuals 
have autonomy interests.  Thus, we express our “recognition of the worth all citizens 
attach to their way of life” (Rawls 1993, 319). 
 
Conclusion 
Toleration requires both opposition and principled reason to refrain from 
interfering.  Conceptually, then, there are people and things that are liked and that thus 
cannot be tolerated (though we can be tolerant of them) and people and things that are 
disliked and thus can be tolerated.  While some of the latter should be tolerated, some 
should not.  A full account of toleration would indicate clearly how to draw these lines.  
Such an account would include a clear conceptual analysis of toleration, a precise and 
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detailed indication of why it is a value, and comprehensive guidelines that explain when 
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